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Special Topics: Pith and Substance
Canada's constitution divides law making power between the
Parliament of Canada and provincial legislatures. This is the
essence of Canadian federalism.
The division of legislative powers is done mainly by
secs. 91-5 of the Constitution Act, 1867. The language of these
sections is quite broad, using phrases like "Trade and Commerce,"
"Property and Civil Rights" and "Generally all Matters of a
merely local or private Nature". In some cases the language granting
law making power is antique - "Asylums" and Eleemosynary
Institutions," for example. Still, in responding to a
challenge that a particular law is beyond the constitutional
power of either Parliament or a provincial legislature, a court
must consult secs. 91-5 - even if they are antique and not
precise, for they are the main sources by which law making power
is given to Canadian legislatures.
A court that consults these provisions will scrutinize the
opening words of secs. 91 and 92 particularly. These opening phrases
use several concepts to create law making power, the main ones
of which are:
- law making power is in relation to matters
- matters come within classes of subjects
- classes of subjects are assigned by the Constitution Act, 1867
- law making powers are exclusive.
These four concepts - in relation to, matters, coming within
classes of subjects assigned by the Constitution Act, exclusivity
- are not of universal intellectual interest, but they are
crucial here because they are found in the text of the
constitutional provisions that assign law making power to
Canadian legislatures. For example, the opening words of
s. 92 assigns power to the provincial legislatures in this
way:
In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws
in relation to Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects
next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say...
Sixteen classes of subjects then follow. Section 91 grants
law making power to Parliament in similar, if more convoluted
language, and by using the same the same four concepts - in relation
to, matters, coming within classes of subjects, exclusivity.
The courts have built a method for dividing constitutional power
out of this language and these four concept. The method is now
well settled. It is specific to Canadian federalism for two
reasons: the language and the concepts used are specific to
Canada's constitution; and the balance of power struck between
the federal and provincial governments is a uniquely Canadian
balance responsive to uniquely Canadian imperatives. Other
federations confront similar problems of dividing and balancing
power, but each solves this problem with its own technique to
arrive at its own specific balance.
The concepts of 'matter' and 'in relation to' require some
explanation."Matters" are constructed by the courts. They
are intellectual fabrications. Courts build them by taking a
cue from the constitutional text, which requires that matters
come within the 16 provincial and 31 federal "classes of
subjects." To meet the requirement that a matter come within a
class of subject, a court must insure that the matter it
constructs is not too big. For example, 'the environment' is too
big to be a matter. It does not come within any of the 16
provincial or 31 federal classes of subjects. But 'pollution
of inland rivers by the dumping of substances in them' is a matter.
So is 'control of the emissions of smokestacks of heavy industry'.
These easily fit with in the enumerated classes of subjects.
Another way to think about this is that if 'the
environment' were allowed to be a matter, it would be
exclusively federal or exclusively provincial. This would disturb
the necessary balance between federal and provincial governments
that Canadian courts have found necessary for the Canadian
federal system. Balance is really the whole point. All the rest
is technique.
"In relation to" must be understood in light of an
opposing concept - ancillary. The constitutional jurisprudence makes
this clear. In relation to - meaning that the law is really all
about this matter. The law is really all about this matter as
opposed to "ancillary" to it. Ancillary - meaning that while the
law may affect the matter, that is not its central focus, or
what it is really all about. A law is in relation to a matter
when its dominant or most important characteristics, its leading
features, its pith and substance are really all about that
matter. Perhaps the law affects the matter in an ancillary or
incidental way; perhaps the law impacts on the matter in
passing, or in ways that are beside the real thrust of the law, but
that does not make the law "in relation to" the matter. Laws
affect many things in a variety of ways, large and small.
These side winds do not determine what matter a law is in
relation to. That is determined by analysing the central focus
of the law, what it is really all about.
In order to analyse what matter a challenged law is
"in relation to" - to separate it from matters incidentally affected
by the law - requires a "pith and substance analysis".
Pith and substance??? A pith and substance analysis
scrutinizes the law to discover:
- the purpose of the law
- the legal effect of the law, that is, impacts that
are expected to happen if the statute works as planned
- the practical effect of the law, that is, impacts the
statute actually causes as it operates, anticipated or
unanticipated. The effects may arise from imperfect
administration, discriminatory enforcement, or unanticipated side
effects caused by the law on the universe of behaviours. For
example, in Saumur v. City of Quebec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299, the
Court struck down a municipal by-law that prohibited
leafleting because it had been applied so as to suppress the
religious views of Jehovah's Witnesses. Similarly, in
Attorney-General for Alberta v. Attorney-General for Canada,
[1939] A.C. 117, the Privy Council struck down a law imposing
a tax on banks because the effects of the tax were so
severe that the true purpose of the law could only be to
destroy banks, not taxation. However, merely incidental effects
will not disturb the constitutionality of a law otherwise in
relation to a matter that comes within the classes of
subjects assigned to the enacting legislature.
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